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dividual firm will raise wages in order to reduce turnover costs. Costs increase,
causing prices to also increase. The monetary authority reacts with restrictive
policies, and unemployment increases. This leads to a new turnover-efficiency-
wage equilibrium, and the process continues. The argument implies that wage
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by discussing some of the consequent policy implications.
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Introduction
The current economic crisis is, in my view, largely a problem of stagflation:
were it not that a stimulation of demand through deficit spending would
result in inflationary pressure, even in the presence of high unemployment,
deficit spending would be an easy remedy to increase production and
employment. If some foreign markets broke away, we could ourselves
simulate their effect on our economy by demanding exactly what they
would have demanded. The same holds true for any kind of demand
deficiency. Attempts of this kind have, however, invariably produced
inflationary hikes, even in presence of unemployment. The theoretical
problem seems to be to understand the sources of these tendencies to
stagflation.
Stagflation may occur as a result of capital shortage: if there are not
enough jobs, there will be unemployment. With capital shortage, any in-
crease in aggregate demand would induce price increases without reducing
unemployment. The current economic situation in Germany is, however,
characterized by excess capacity rather than by capital shortage. I shall
focus therefore more specifically on stagflation in the presence of excess
capacity.
What I am trying to do is to develop a view – one particular view – of
stagflation. This view concentrates on turnover efficiency wages. The core
idea is that, in the long run, the unemployed become irrelevant for wage
formation, even if recruitment is drawn from the unemployment pool.
Thus, unemployment ceases to be a stabilizing force for wage movements.
In such a setting, inflationary pressure will eventually emerge from the
wage side at all employment levels, irrespective of the absolute level of
wages. This is bound to induce, sooner or later, price inflation at all employ-
ment levels. If these tendencies are countered by restrictive monetary and
fiscal policies, unemployment will increase, and the process will continue,
slowly, intermittently, and, ultimately, inescapably.
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Other mechanisms to autonomous wage inflation may be envisaged.
Winfried V (1994) has developed a very similar view, based on discipline-
efficiency wages, and the idea that unions bargain only for the employed,
but not for the unemployed, may lead to a similar result. For the sake of
concreteness, however, I shall confine the discussion to the turnover case.
1 Overview
The paper is organized into seven sections. In Section 2, I repeat the
turnover argument. Market clearing wages and turnover-efficiency wages
are contrasted. Market clearing wages serve the function of equating
demand and supply in all segments of the labor market, whereas turnover-
efficiency wages prevent workers from leaving. The first has to do with at-
tracting workers, the latter with retaining them. Thus, turnover-efficiency
wages are set in order to control future behavior rather than past behavior,
and so may be called forward-looking. (Discipline efficiency wages are
forward-looking as well.)
In Section 3, I discuss wage formation over the business cycle within a
framework of turnover-efficiency wages. It is argued that forward-looking
wages will mainly respond to changes of employment, rather than to un-
employment itself, since the job opportunities of the employed are mainly
affected by improvements or deterioration in outside opportunities. The
employed have, however, a competitive advantage over the unemployed to
obtain a new job, and so the level of unemployment has no major influence
on their outside options.
In Section 4, I discuss wage formation under the assumption that the
instruments for demand management, and monetary and fiscal policy
work perfectly well: economic policy succeeds in stabilizing the price
level by controlling aggregate demand. It is argued that this will result
in a continuous contraction of economic activity. In other words, the
traditional Phillips-curve, linking inflationary pressure and unemployment,
is replaced by a curve that links inflationary pressure to the change in
unemployment. Inflationary pressure will be zero if unemployment is
steadily increasing, and any successful stabilization policy will eventually
cause such a contraction.
In Sections 5-7, I conclude by discussing some policy aspects of the view
developed here.
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2 Labor Turnover and Forward-Looking Wages
With on-the-job training provided by firms, turnover is costly, and wages
have the dual functions of attracting new applicants and keeping the
incumbents with the firm. Conceptually, we may think of two wage rates:
one wage serves to attract new workers; the other serves to keep the old,
wg and wl, respectively. The wage wo is the market-clearing wage, and the
wage wl is known as the efficiency wage.1
Consider first the case that firms offer the same conditions to all newly
recruited workers, irrespective of whether they have been pirated from
other firms or hired from the unemployment pool.2
With training sufficiently important and the training period sufficiently
long, the firm will set the efficiency wage rather than the (lower) market
clearing wage in order to avoid high turnover costs.3
This does not imply, however, that there will be unemployment. It
is erroneous to equate excess supply in any particular segment of the
labor market with unemployment, since the majority of applicants for any
job are usually employed somewhere else and simply try to find a better
job. If they don’t succeed, they keep their old job rather than join the
unemployment pool.
Hence, the turnover-efficiency-wage argument is by no means restricted
to unemployment, although it can be used in such a context. It provides
simply an argument why, in any segment of the labor market, wages may
1 For turnover-efficiency wage models, see S (1974), S (1979), S (1978).
Surveys are provided in Y (1984) and S (1987). 2 The usual critique of
turnover-wages (as well as other types of efficiency wages) is that profit-maximizing firms
would offer more elaborate wage contracts, involving entrance fees or bonding, for instance.
This would eliminate involuntary unemployment. As we do not find such contracts in
practice, it seems that they are not feasible for other reasons, and this observation provides
the rationale for assuming job-specific wages. Relevant arguments on that may be found e.g.
in W et al. (1975), T (1977, 81-85), S (1987, 29-30), and F et al.
(1993). 3 With low turnover costs, the firm will only pay market-clearing wages. The
background of the argument is thus high turnover costs. Why has this not been a problem
in the fifties? I suggest that this has to do with changes in technology and automatizing:
routine work can presumably be automatized more easily than work of sophisticated and
responsible nature. Automatizing will thus lead to a relative decline of routine work and a
relative increase in responsible tasks (S, 1979, 62). The massive decline of blue-collar
work confirms this. The recent growth in the service sector may, however, mitigate or even
reverse this tendency, since it involves often very simple routine work. Turnover is high, and
turnover costs are low, but productivity is low as well. (See however S (1994) on a
theoretical argument with regard to this observation.)
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be so high as to attract much more qualified applicants than needed
(S, 1981).
In such a setting, wage formation would be forward looking : wages
would be set such as to prevent experienced workers from leaving, but
there would be chronic excess supply for all job openings. In contrast,
market-clearing wages may be characterized as backward looking : they
equate demand and supply for vacancies.
Discipline-efficiency wages (S and S 1984, F 1986)
would amount to much the same: the threat of dismissal is inversely
related to re-employment chances. If employment is rising, there are
new hires and re-employment chances are good even if there is some
unemployment. If employment is contracting, re- employment chances
are bad, even if the level of unemployment is low.
If firms optimize their labor demand, they will equate the marginal pro-
ductivity of labor with the wage rate by creating just the optimal number of
jobs. There is no reason to expect efficiency wages generally, and forward-
looking wages in particular, to deviate systematically from marginal pro-
ductivity.
3 Wage Formation Through the Business Cycle
Consider now an environment of upswings and downswings of employ-
ment. If there is an upswing, the demand for workers increases, and the
firms will try to prevent a drain on their workforce by improving work
conditions, including pay. We should see wage increases, but these wage
increases are not instigated by any kind of supply shortage. They are due
to the improvement in outside options for the incumbent workers, which
must be matched by wage increases. We should, therefore, expect that an
upswing will induce wage hikes, even under conditions of unemployment.
During a downswing, a drain on the workforce may be less costly, and
even desired, since it may align employment with production. We should
expect, therefore, a decrease in wages. This tendency may, however, be
soothed by a concern to keep the workers’ morale intact, and by a fear of
adverse selection.
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In conclusion, we should expect the wage rate to respond primarily to
changes in employment.1
Similarly, discipline-efficiency wages will respond to changes in em-
ployment, as the threat of dismissal is directly related to re-employment
prospects. All &s corresponds to the observation that wages are fairly
flexible over the business cycle. But flexible wages will not necessarily be
market clearing, and it is erroneous to conclude that non-market clearing
wages must be related to some sort of wage rigidity.
4 Autonomous Wage Inflation
Consider next the interrelationship of wages and persistent unemployment.
For any particular wage level, the firms will set their wages such as to
maximize their profits by selecting a wage that reduces turnover sufficiently,
but is neither too high nor too costly. Each firm fixes a wage in this manner,
while taking the general level of wages as given. There is no guarantee,
however, that the general wage level will remain what it has been. If many
firms set their wage above the average wage level, this will lead to an
increase in the general level of wages. If many firms set the wage level
below the average, this will pull the average down.
Let each firm set its optimal wage. Consider the case that many firms
select a rather high wage rate. This will push the wage level up. Wage
inflation occurs, and each firm ends up with a real wage which is too low,
since it has been determined without anticipating the raises of the other
firms. The process continues. After a while, firms will start to anticipate
wage inflation. If a firm finds it optimal to increase its real wage, it will
take into account anticipated inflation. Thus will accelerate wage inflation.
If the process remains uncontrolled, an ever-accelerating rate of inflation
will result. Similarly, wage deflation would accelerate over time.
Accelerating inflation or accelerating deflation could be avoided by
1 C (1993) concluded on the basis of a very detailed data set that a change in current
wage is a much more important determinant of quit decisions than the current wage level.
(He advanced however an argument different from the present one to explain this regularity.)
In their study of wage drift in Germany, G and R (1987, 46-48) report a significant
impact of the rate of change in unemployment in all cases. However, the impact of the level
of unemployment was never significant and had the wrong sign in 5 out of 16 cases. C
(1990) presented an extensive study of wage formation in fifteen sectors of fourteen countries.
In most cases, the change in employment turned out to be of more importance than the level.
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bringing the corrective force of emerging unemployment into play, and is
precisely what the early turnover-efficiency wage models suggested. With
increased unemployment, it will be harder for each employed worker to
obtain a better offer. Hence, turnover will decrease, thereby reducing the
need for the firms to pay above-the-average wages for controlling turnover.
Symmetrically, a reduction in unemployment would make it necessary for
firms to offer higher wages, and so remove deflationary pressure.
Wage increases translate into rising costs that will, sooner or later, lead to
price inflation. Economic policy is bound to control inflation by restrictive
I measures. If it is successful, employment will be curbed. By decreasing
employment, the need to pay above-the-average wages will be removed
and inflationary pressure will recede. This suggests that a stable ”natural”
rate of unemployment is necessary to avoid accelerating inflation.
This argument is, however, only valid in the short run, since prolonged
unemployment will lead to a deterioration of the skills of the unemployed
vis-á-vis the skills of the employed. There will be human capital deprecia-
tion, so to speak, with pernicious long-run consequences.
Persistent unemployment will result in a less qualified supply in several
ways. The employed keep up-to-date with the most recent technology,
while the unemployed do not. Further, and more importantly, a reduction
in economic activity reduces also the amount of on-the-job training in
the economy. Only a smaller number of apprentices will be trained, and
the supply of qualified craftsmen will be reduced after a while. Similarly,
all occupations that require previous job experience of some kind will be
supplied with fewer trained workers. The number of qualified workers
in the unemployment pool will thus decrease, and qualifications of the
long-term unemployed will become outdated. In the very long run, 50 per
cent employment will create only 50 per cent qualified applicants for all
jobs requiring previous work experience.
It is only for the ports-of-entry that the number of the unemployed
may be of relevance. With forward-looking wages, supply conditions
are, however, fairly irrelevant. Wages are set to prevent turnover, and
turnover is reduced by unemployment only if the incumbent workers
face competition from-om the unemployed. For all jobs that require
previous work experience, this can only temporarily be the case, since the
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unemployed will have no work experience in the long run. (In Sao Paulo
there is sometimes a tight labor market in spite of severe unemployment.)1
As a consequence, unemployment will, in the long run, cease to be an
effective check on labor turnover. Wage inflation will emerge independently
of the level of unemployment and the absolute wage level, and a fkt11er
reduction in employment will be needed to prevent it &om accelerating.
In this way we may envision a process of economic decline.
5 Negative Policy Implications
The argument outlined here has positive and negative policy implications.
I begin with what the argument does not imply.
Wage rigidity. Long-term unemployment is not caused by wage rigidity
and hence, will not be curbed by making wages more flexible. Actually,
wages are quite flexible, but move in wrong direction2 More flexibility may
mean this wrong movement speeds up, along with the problems.
The welfare state. Long-term unemployment is not caused by the wel-
fare state. Actually, the unemployed are functionless for wage formation,
regardless of how well off they are. The course of events would be the same
if all unemployed were worse off or better off.3
Wage structure. Long-term unemployment is not caused by a wage
structure too compressed across occupations. Often the argument is made
that if wages between “good” and “bad” industries differed much more,
the unemployment problem would be alleviated. However, the argument
presented in this paper would not be affected by larger wage spread. To
repeat: the argument is that, irrespective of the level of unemployment and
wages, wage inflation will eventually occur in all sectors with sufficiently
high turnover costs. A larger spread of wages might alleviate the unemploy-
ment temporarily, but it will not eliminate the problem of autonomous
wage inflation: it will simply postpone it.
There is, however, a strong objection to be made against reducing min-
imum wages. From an allocative point of view, labor should flow to em-
ployment that creates the highest value-added. If we permit wages to rise
1 There is some empirical evidence that the long-run unemployed exert only a minor influ-
ence on wage formation; see e.g. H (1991), F (1991), M and V (1991),
C (1989). G (1991) reports a different result, however. 2 On wage flexibility
under corporatism, see also B and E (1992). 3 S (1990, 11-16)
summarizes evidence that job finding rates were were only marginally affected by monetary
rewards.
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in “good” industries, the incentive to create new jobs in these industries is
reduced. A textbook labor market would achieve just that, because wages
for comparable work would be equalized across the economy. If this mech-
anism does not work, we should simulate it, rather than weaken it further.
In other words: wages for comparable work in “good” and “bad” industries
should be equalized in order to create a proper allocation of labor. (Note
that one of the main advantages of capitalism over labor management
relates to that point. Permitting a larger wage spread amounts, in a sense,
to simulating one distinctive disadvantage of labor management.)
High wages. Long-term unemployment is not caused by wages that are
too high. Rather, we could have full employment and higher profits at the
current wage level, as productivity increases more than proportionally with
increasing employment (“Okun’s law”). The problem is rather that wages
would be too high at full employment, due to our wage-setting mechanism.
Labor unions. Long-term unemployment is not caused by the German
system of labor unions. The problem occurs in all industrialized nations,
sometimes more pronounced than in Germany, and seems to be fairly
independent of the system of collective bargaining. Actually, it is rather
unclear in which way unions influence wages. Finns usually pay more than
standard wages, voluntarily. Further, there is much latitude in fixing qual-
ification standards. By tightening standards, and by informally insisting
on unpaid overtime work, firms may actually reduce labor costs in spite
of rigid union contracts. As the labor contract is, by its very nature, only
vaguely defining duties and responsibilities, there is always latitude in all
directions which prevents effective price control.
6 Positive Policy Implications
The analysis suggests also some ways of interfering with the current wage-
setting mechanism. A few possibilities follow.
Loosening employment protection. If a new worker is hired, and after a
training period, his performance is deemed unsatisfactory, 11e must be
laid-off. Insofar as employment protection legislation hampers dismissal,
and renders it more costly, firms will take precautions to lire only can-
didates with immaculate background characteristics. This will worsen
the position of the unemployed vis- a-vis the employed applicants and
contribute to inflationary pressure on the wage side. An easing of dismissal
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would thus mitigate the problem of autonomous wage inflation. Fur-
ther, a change of employment would be more risky without employment
protection, and would work in the same direction.
Lower wages for the unemployed. A new development occurred recently
in the chemical industry in Germany. The employers union and the labor
union reached an agreement that permits firms to pay newly recruited
unemployed only 95 per cent of the relevant standard wage rate. (The
starting wage for long-term unemployed can even be reduced to 90 per
cent of the standard wage.) This renders hiring an unemployed worker
cheaper than an employed worker, and may enable the unemployed to
effectively compete with employed applicants. Such a change may help
to reduce inflationary pressure on the wage side: if the incumbents have
to compete with the unemployed for offers, their prospects of obtaining
an offer that would make it worthwhile to change employers are reduced.
Since forward-looking wages are determined by the prospects for better
offers, this should somewhat remove inflationary pressure from the wage
side.
Such wage discrimination against the unemployed should be made
obligatory (rather than optional) for the following reason: If a firm pays
less because it uses its discretion, it could be bad for morale; if there is
an obligation to pay less, its chance of being better accepted increases.
Because the possibility to pay new workers less has been always there, but
never used in a discriminative way against recruits from the unemployment
pool, we should not expect the practice to spread on its own. It must,
therefore, be forced on employers. (There are actually many cases where
new workers are required to finish fewer parts than incumbents in order
to obtain performance-related benefits. This practice, which amounts to
higher pay for new workers, is spreading in light engineering.)
Note that the primary purpose of lower wages for the unemployed is not
to reduce unemployment – this would require an increase in demand and
production. Rather, the purpose of such a measure would be to reduce
the chances of employed workers to obtain better offers, and make the
unemployed competitive. This would remove the tendency to wage infla-
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tion and would permit a ”Keynesian” stimulation of aggregate demand.1
However, effective wage competition between the incumbents and the
unemployed may generate an “insider-outsider” problem with adverse
productivity consequences, a situation firms may try to avoid.
Taxation. There is also the possibility to reduce inflationary pressure by
taxation. A turnover tax or a progressive wage tax would render higher wage
offers less effective. This would reduce the tendency to wage inflation.2
7 De-Coupling Relative Wages and Money Wages
The problem of stagflation is neither structural nor cyclical, but is rooted
in our wage-setting institutions, i.e., is institutional.3 Hence, it requires an
institutional response: re-shape wage-setting mechanisms.
I am somewhat reluctant to discuss specific proposals in this direction,
since such a discussion tends to obscure and bury the main point in irrele-
vant institutional detail, and to offend many vested interests. Nevertheless,
for the sake of the argument, consider the following proposal.4
The main function of wage bargaining in the various sectors of the
economy is to fix the system of relative, rather than absolute, wages: what
should a metal worker earn, as compared to a chemical worker? Such
ratios are determined by fixing money wages for the various occupations.
Competition among firms determines the price level from that, and this
determines the level of real wages.
All this would be independent of the price level, but there is the necessity
to prevent accelerating Inflation or deflation. It has been argued here that
the tendency for most firms is to eventually offer higher than average
wages. This leads to autonomous wage inflation, and restrictive measures
are to be introduced to curb this wage inflation.
In the end, the price level is to be stabilized by increased unemployment.
This is a very wasteful system of wage control, socially. A much cheaper
1 In Germany, employers hiring workers that have been unemployed for more than one year,
may obtain an unconditional wage subsidy of 50% for one year. The subsidy increases to
70% for workers who have been out of employment for more than three years. In spite of
these high subsidies, the program is only rarely used (B, 1989). This suggests
that the preference for employed applicants is indeed very pronounced. 2 The case of a
progressive wage tax is analyzed in S (1994). 3 I am somewhat repeating here
what I have said ten years ago (S, 1983, 651). Sorry. 4 Other proposals have
been made, most notably profit-sharing (W, 1984) and tri-partite wage setting (M,
1993), but I do not want to discuss these proposals here.
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way would be to settle those wage bargains in terms of a unit of account,
say ”Taler” and to require all labor contracts to be written in Taler. The
Bundesbank would be in charge of determining the exchange rate between
Taler and Deutschmark in such a way as to prevent inflation.
Such a solution would enable the Bundesbank to control inflation in a
much cheaper way than is done presently: Instead of using unemployment
to control real wages, this is done directly -and by the same institution -by
fixing the Taler/Deutschmark exchange rate.
There are, of course, problems with such a proposal. Consider the
following objection: If firms and workers are more interested in money
wages than in Taler wages, they will have an incentive to index their
contracts accordingly, and will find ways to do so. This will render Taler
contracts ineffective in controlling money wages.
The argument may be misleading for several reasons:
1. Workers may actually be more interested in relative wages than in
absolute wages, since their judgment refers to what they observe in
their reference groups (D 1949, 17-68, F 1984, S
1990, 5-10).
2. Firms may actually be more interested in relative wages than in ab-
solute wages since their competitive position depends on their own
costs, not absolutely, but relative to the costs of their competitors.
3. Indexing will be costly and will only be used if distortions are suffi-
ciently high.
In the end, it is hard to form a judgment about this or other proposals
without further evidence. We should, however, seek a solution.
Conclusion
I have tried to argue that the turnover-efficiency wage story may help
to understand the problem of stagflation. It suggests actually more than
stagflation, namely autonomous wage inflation: wages will ultimately rise
at all levels of employment unless this is countered by restrictive policy. As
long as the long- term unemployed cease to be effective competitors for
the employed, we should expect such a result.
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Other mechanisms may work in a similar direction. Unions play a role.
The current bargaining in the banking and insurance sector of the German
economy is explicitly conducted by the union, with the argument that the
overall state of the labor market is quite irrelevant to the negotiation. The
high profits there are used to justify high wage increases, in spite of severe
unemployment. A combination of high unemployment, high profitability,
and high wages throughout the economy is imaginable. Such a pattern,
if generalized, may easily lead to a result quite similar to the one I have
sketched above.1
This must be avoided. Institutional reforms are needed. If the proposal
for decoupling money wages and relative wages discussed above is not
convincing, a better solution is needed. The important thing is to face the
problem. There is perhaps no better expression of this concern than in
following quotation, from James Meade’s Nobel Memorial Lecture, held in
1977:
I do not, I think, exaggerate wildly when I conclude by saying
that one – though, of course, only one – of the really important
factors on which the health of the world now depends is the
recasting of wage-fixing arrangements in a limited number of
developed countries. (M, 1993, 9).
Appendix
The following formalizes the problem of autonomous wage inflation in an
extremely simple way.
Let L denote the fixed labor force and U the number of unemployed. If
an employed worker looks for a better job, he will face competition not
from all the unemployed, but only from that part of unemployment that
is still competitive. Denote that part of unemployment that affects wage
setting by effective unemployment E.
Effective unemployment increases if new unemployment occurs, and
decreases over time, due to depreciation of human capital. Let δ stand
1 O (1993) has argued that unions pursue the interest of the median member (and
median voter). The median member has acquired some seniority. Lay-offs are not a severe
threat to him, but only to the workers with low seniority. This scenario renders unions
indifferent with regard to employment. In so far as unions are able to influence the overall
wage level in the economy, we should expect such a development.
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for the rate of depreciation, and denote time derivatives by a dot over the
corresponding variable. For the change of effective unemployment over
time we may write:
E˙ = U˙ −δE (1)
The effective rate of unemployment is given by the ratio of effective
unemployment and employment:
e := E
L−U (2)
The effective rate of unemployment will influence turnover and pro-
ductivity.1 Further, the wage offered by the Firm w in relation to the
wage level W will affect turnover and productivity. We may write for labor
productivity, α:
α=α (v,e) (3)
with
v := w
W
(4)
as the relative wage rate, and derivatives
∂α
∂v
> 0 , ∂
2α
∂v2
< 0 , ∂α
∂e
> 0 , ∂
2α
∂v2
< 0 , ∂
2α
∂α∂v
< 0. (5)
The typical firm will maximize productivity per Deutschmark by selecting
an optimal wage rate:
α (v,e)
v ·W →maxv ! (6)
This leads to the „Solow-condition"
αv · v
α
= 1. (7)
This gives, for any effective rate of unemployment e, an optimal relative
wage rate v for the typical firm. If v > 1, the typical firm sets its wage above
the average, and the wage level will increase. For v < 1, the typical firm sets
its wage rate below the average and the wage level will decline. Effective
stabilization would require an effective rate of unemployment such that
1 The following is similar to S (1978) and Y (1984).
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the typical firm sets v = 1. Denote this effective rate of unemployment by
e∗. Keeping e equal to e∗ over time implies according to (2):
E˙ = e∗ (L−U˙ ) (8)
and, together with (1) and (2),
U˙ = e
∗
1+e∗ (L+δ (L−U ))> 0 for L >U . (9)
To achieve wage stability, unemployment must be increasing. Further,
from (1) and (2) it can be seen that a constant level of unemployment leads
to a continuous decline in the rate of effective unemployment and will,
therefore, lead to e < e∗ and to wage inflation. The argument has neglected
many fine points and qualifications (in particular the cyclical response
of wages discussed in Section 3 above), but it may serve to illustrate the
argument in a formal manner.
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